Courage and tightness

Conceptions of courage vary according to how high the ethical threshold is set for the motivations which underlie the bold behavior, and what kinds of motivation are allowed to count. In modern philosophical jargon, they differ in degree of moral ‘thickness’.

Let’s recall Aristotle’s brisk definition of courage:
‘The man… who faces and who fears the right things and from the right motive, in the right way and at the right time, and who feels confidence under the corresponding conditions, is brave’.
But now the question is, what are the right things, motives, ways and times to which the formula refers? What are the degrees of moral ‘thickness’?
And how does courage differ from other conditions to which it appears related, such as:
heroism, valor, daring, boldness, firmness, perseverance, ‘grit’? What is ‘fortitude’?

In adding flesh to the bones of his definition Aristotle travels the via negativa – a merely negative method, listing a number of circumstances in which we might be tempted to ascribe courage but where the right conditions are not properly met. By saying what courage is not, Aristotle evidently things we arrive at a clearer idea of what it is.

Yet when we look for unmistakable cases of courage – a more positive, inspiring way to travel -, the search proves surprisingly hard.
To my opinion this hardship is related to the challenge of tackling the normative issues to determine with greater precision just what courage is (and isn’t).
Generally speaking, the more solitary the moral stance one takes, the more courage one needs to sustain it.
This relates to an important characteristic of humanism: autonomy.

(to be continued)

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